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RESTRAINT OF AGENCY PROCEEDINGS UNDER
THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
In 1966 Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act' (FOIA)
in order to increase the general public's access to documents and
1§ 552. Public information; agency rules, opinions, orders, records, and proceed-
ings.
(a) Each agency shall make available to the public information as follows:
(1) Each agency shall separately state and currently publish in the Federal
Register for the guidance of the public-
(A) descriptions of its central and field organization and the
established places at which, the employees (and in the case of a
uniformed service, the members) from whom, and the methods
whereby, the public may obtain information, make submittals or
requests, or obtain decisions;
(B) statements of the general course and method by which its
functions are channeled and determined, including the nature and
requirements of all formal and informal procedures available;
(C) rules of procedure, descriptions of forms available or the
places at which forms may be obtained, and instructions as to the
scope and contents of all papers, reports, or examinations;
(D) substantive rules of general applicability adopted as au-
thorized by law, and statements of general policy or interpretations
of general applicability formulated and adopted by the agency;
and
(E) each amendment, revision, or repeal of the foregoing.
Except to the extent that a person has actual and timely notice of
the terms thereof, a person may not in any manner be required to
resort to, or be adversely affected by, a matter required to be
published in the Federal Register and not so published. For the
purpose of this paragraph, matter reasonably available to the class
of persons affected thereby is deemed published in the Federal
Register when incorporated by reference therein with the approval
of the Director of the Federal Register.
(2) Each agency, in accordance with published rules, shall make available
for public inspection and copying-
(A) final opinions, including concurring and dissenting opin-
ions, as well as orders, made in the adjudication of cases;
(B) those statements of policy and interpretations which have
been adopted by the agency and are not published in the Federal
Register; and
(C) administrative staff manuals and instructions to staff
that affect a member of the public;
unless the materials are promptly published and copies offered for sale. To
the extent required to prevent a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy, an agency may delete identifying details when it makes available
or publishes an opinion, statement of policy, interpretation, or staff manual
or instruction. However, in each case the justification for the deletion shall
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be explained fully in writing. Each agency also shall maintain and make
available for public inspection and copying a current index providing iden-
tifying information for the public as to any matter issued, adopted, or
promulgated after July 4, 1967, and required by this paragraph to be made
available or published. A final order, opinion, statement of policy, interpre-
tation, or staff manual or instruction that affects a member of the public
may be relied on, used, or cited as precedent by an agency against a party
other than an agency only if-
(i) it has been indexed and either made available or
published as provided by this paragraph; or
(ii) the party has actual and timely notice of the terms
thereof.
(3) Except with respect to the records made available under paragraphs
(1) and (2) of this subsection, each agency, on request for identifiable
records made in accordance with published rules stating the time, place,
fees to the extent authorized by statute, and procedure to be followed,
shall make the records promptly available to any person. On complaint,
the district court of the United States in the district in which the com-
plainant resides, or has his principal place of business, or in which the
agency records are situated, has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from
withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency
records improperly withheld from the complainant. In such a case the
court shall determine the matter de novo and the burden is on the agency
to sustain its action. In the event of noncompliance with the order of the
court, the district court may punish for contempt the responsible em-
ployee, and in the case of a uniformed service, the responsible member.
Except as to causes the court considers of greater importance, proceed-
ings before the district court, as authorized by this paragraph, take pre-
cedence on the docket over all other causes and shall be assigned for
hearing and trial at the earliest practicable date and expedited in every
way.
(4) Each agency having more than one member shall maintain and make
available for public inspection a record of the final votes of each member
in every agency proceeding.
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are-
(1) specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the
interest of the national defense or foreign policy;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an
agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained
from a person and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which
would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation
with the agency;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of
which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal pri-
vacy;
(7) investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except
to the extent available by law to a party other than an agency;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition
reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible
for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
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information held by federal agencies.2 The legislative history of the
FOIA clearly shows that Congress intended the increased availability
of information to facilitate the electoral process by promoting voter
awareness of the functioning and efficiency of federal agencies.3 It is
not clear from the legislative history, however, whether Congress in-
tended the FOIA to be used by a party engaged in federal agency
proceedings to restrain those proceedings and force the agency decid-
ing the case to disclose relevant materials which might not be avail-
able to the party under agency regulations. In short, Congress gave
no clear directive whether the FOIA could be used as a discovery tool
in agency proceedings.
Dealing with this issue for the first time, the Supreme Court, in
the recent case of Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft Clothing Co.,4
split 5-45 in finding that the FOIA could not be used as a discovery
tool in proceedings of the Renegotiation Board,6 a federal agency
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including
maps, concerning wells.
(c) This section does not authorize withholding of information or limit the
availability of records to the public, except as specifically stated in this section.
This section is not authority to withhold information from Congress.
5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
'The FOIA provides "a true Federal public records statute by requiring the availa-
bility, to any member of the public, of all of the executive branch records described in
its requirements, except those involving matters which are within nine stated exemp-
tions." H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1966).
Today the very vastness of our Government and its myriad of agencies
makes it difficult for the electorate to obtain [information] ....
But it is only when one further considers the hundreds of departments,
branches, and agencies which are not directly responsible to the peo-
ple, that one begins to understand the great importance of having an
information policy of full disclosure.
Although the theory of an informed electorate is vital to the pro-
per operation of a democracy, there is nowhere in our present law a
statute which affirmatively provides for that information ....
It is the purpose of the present bill ... to establish a general
philosophy of full agency disclosure unless information is exempted
under clearly delineated statutory language. ...
S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965).
'415 U.S. 1 (1974).
'Mr. Justice Blackmun delivered the decision of the Court in which Mr. Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, White, and Rehnquist joined. Mr. Justice Doug-
las filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Powell joined.
"'We hold... that in a renegotiation case the contractor is obliged to pursue its
administrative remedy and, when it fails to do so, may not attain its ends through the
route of judicial interference." Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S.
1, 20 (1974). See text accompanying notes 3-4 supra.
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which reviews the profits of government contractors. The Court held
that although contractors could file FOIA suits while engaged in rene-
gotiation proceedings, 7 they could not obtain restraints of those pro-
ceedings during court resolution of their FOIA claims,' even though
the FOIA specifically grants equitable powers to district courts hear-
ing such claims.' The Bannercraft contractors had requested the Re-
negotiation Board to turn over materials which they claimed were
important to the determination of excess profits in their cases, and
when the Board refused, they filed FOIA suits in district courts.10 The
contractors sought not only injunctions to force disclosure of the ma-
terials which they had requested, but also restraints of renegotiations
while their claims were being adjudicated." They argued that if the
proceedings were not halted, a court order requiring the disclosure of
the materials would be of little value because renegotiations would
have passed the stage at which the materials would be useful to them
in dealing with the Board. 2 The district courts granted the requested
restraints 3 and the court of appeals affirmed.
The Supreme Court reversed"1 for two reasons. First, the Court
found that Congress did not specifically intend for the FOIA to pro-
vide parties engaged in agency proceedings with a new discovery
tool."8 Absent such clear intent, the Court refused to permit the re-
straint of the renegotiation process which, according to earlier Su-
preme Court rulings, Congress had clearly intended to proceed with-
out court interruption 7 and which was designed to promote informal
Board-contractor negotiations. Second, no injunctive relief could be
granted these contractors because they had failed to show that they
t7he Court remanded the case for a determination of the merits of the contractors'
FOIA claims. Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. at 26. Had the
contractors not been able to file FOIA suits while engaged in renegotiations, presuma-
bly the Supreme Court would have required dismissal of the contractors' claims. See




"Id. at 6, 8, 9.
'2Brief for Respondent Bannercraft Clothing Co. at 27-28. Brief for Respondent
David B. Lilly Co. at 20-23, Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S.
1 (1974).
13Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 6, 8, 9 (1974).
"Bannercraft Clothing Co. v. Renegotiation Bd., 466 F.2d 345, 351 (D.C. Cir.
1972).





would suffer irreparable harm without a restraint.19 Essential to the
Court's holding was its consideration of the nature of the Renegotia-
tion Act and the FOIA, and its interpretation of the congressional
intent behind each statute. An understanding of the decision, there-
fore, requires an examination of the two Acts.
The original renegotiation legislation"0 was passed during World
War II to prevent profiteering on war contracts." At the end of the
War, Congress allowed the Renegotiation Act to expire, but because
the Cold War required increasing procurement, the legislature reacti-
vated renegotiation on a limited scale in 1948.2 In response to the
Korean conflict, Congress further expanded the review of profits in
the Renegotiation Act of 1951.1
The 1951 Act and the regulations which it atithorized"4 estab-
lished complex renegotiation proceedings. Contractors subject to the
statute 5 must file annual financial statements with the Board,2
"Id. at 23-24.
2'Act of Oct. 21, 1942, ch. 619, § 801, 56 Stat. 982, as amended, Act of July 14,
1943, ch. 239, § 1, 57 Stat. 564, Act of Feb. 25, 1944, ch. 63, § 701, 58 Stat. 78, Act of
June 30, 1945, ch. 210, § 1, 59 Stat. 294.2 "The American people are united in their resolution to prevent war profiteering.
Taxation alone is not enough. One of the most constructive attempts ever made to
reduce profiteering at the expense of the Government in wartime was the renegotiation
law . . . ." 90 CONG. REc. 145 (1944) (message to the Congress from the President).
22Act of May 21, 1948, ch. 333, § 3, 62 Stat. 260.
2Act of March 23, 1951, ch. 15, §§ 101-13, 65 Stat. 7. This Act has been extended
10 times, the latest extension in 1973. Act of July 9, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-66, § 1, 87
Stat. 152.
2150 U.S.C. App. § 1217(e) (1970).
"Contractors having contracts with the Department of Defense, the Department
of the Army, the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force, the
Maritime Administration, the Federal Maritime Board, the General Services Adminis-
tration, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Federal Aviation
Agency, and the Atomic Energy Commission, 50 U.S.C. App. § 1213(a) (1970), or other
agencies in time of a national emergency, id., and receiving or accruing from these
contracts more than $1,000,000 during the fiscal year are subject to renegotiation. 50
U.S.C. App. § 1212(a), 1215(f) (1970). These general provisions governing the Act's
application are limited by certain mandatory exemptions. Id. § 1216(a)-(c), (e) (1970),
as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 1216(a)(6) (Supp. 11, 1973) and certain Board-
authorized exemptions. 50 U.S.C. App. § 1216(d) (1970); 32 C.F.R. § 1470.3 (1973).
2, Every person who holds contracts or subcontracts, -to which the pro-
visions of this title are applicable, shall, in such form and detail as
the Board may by regulations prescribe, file with the Board on or
before the first day of the fourth calendar month following the close
of his fiscal year, a financial statement setting forth such information
as the Board may by regulations prescribe as necessary to carry out
this title.
50 U.S.C. App. § 1215(e)(1) (1970). This filing is the Standard Form of Contractor's
Report, 32 C.F.R. § 1470.3 (1973).
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which screens these filings to determine whether a contractor might
have received or accrued excess profits during the previous year.2 If
the Board decides that profits are reasonable, it sends the contractor
a notice of clearance;2 however, if it finds profits to be excessive, it
begins multi-stage proceedings which allow the contractor to confer
with various Board personnel at different levels of the renegotiation
process.2 9 At each level, the Board officials make a finding of the
amount of excess profits, if any,3" and then attempt to reach an agree-
ment with the contractor to eliminate any excesses. 3' If the contractor
reaches the last level of proceedings without either reaching an agree-
ment or convincing the Board that his profits are not excessive,3 2 the
Board may enter a determination of the amount which the contractor
must refund to the Government.3 3 This determination becomes final
27 After receipt of a Standard Form of Contractor's Report from a con-
tractor, the Board will assign the case to a Regional Board [a subdivi-
sion of the Renegotiation Board, 32 C.F.R. § 1451.32 (1973)] for rene-
gotiation if it determines that further proceedings in the matter are
warranted .... No assignment will be made when the Board can
readily decide on the basis of the information contained in the Stan-
dard Form of Contractor's Report that the contractor has not realized
excessive profits for the fiscal year and that no purpose would be
served by making an assignment to a Regional Board. If the Board
decides not to make an assignment, the Board will notify the contrac-
tor to this effect.
Id. § 1471.1; id. § 1498.6 (clearance form).
'See note 27 supra.
"See note 27 supra.
3 The Standard Form of Contractor's Report, supplemented with information
gathered in meetings with the contractor, 32 C.F.R. § 1472.3(a) (1973), forms the basis
for an Accounting Report, id. § 1472.3(e), which then serves as a basis for a Renegotia-
tion Report which makes a recommended finding of excess profits. Id. § 1472.3(i).
These reports may later be presented to the Regional Board, id. § 1472.3(k)(1)-(3),
but this Board may make its own determination of excess profits. Id. § 1472.3(k)(4),
(m). The Renegotiation Board itself may also make an independent determination of
excess profits. Id. § 1472.4(b)(1), (c)(1).
3The contractor may meet with Regional Board personnel, 32 C.F.R. § 1472.3(0)
(1973), a panel of the Regional Board, id. § 1472.3(1), or the Renegotiation Board or a
division of it, id. § 1472.4(b)(2).
1
2A renegotiator, 32 C.F.R. § 1472.3(f) (1973), the Regional Board or the Renegotia-
tion Board, id. § 1473.4(c)(2), may set in motion procedures leading to a notice of
clearance to the contractor. Id. §§ 1473.1-.4.
3 If the Board does not make an agreement with respect to the elimina-
tion of excessive profits received or accrued, it shall issue and enter
an order determining the amount, if any, of such excessive profits
... . In the absence of the filing of a petition with the Court of
Claims . . . such order shall be final and conclusive . ...
50 U.S.C. APP. § 1215(a) (Supp. 111, 1973), amending 50 U.S.C. APP. § 1215 (1970).
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unless the contractor brings his case before the Court of Claims
which, in a de novo proceeding, examines the evidence and makes a
new determination of excess profits. 4
Renegotiation proceedings are not subject to the usual rules of
agency procedure set out in the Administrative Procedure Act except
those of section 3 of that Act dealing with the disclosure of informa-
tion to the public.35 The original section 3,31 although intended by
Congress to require the publication or release of most agency-held
information, 37 provided that some materials should be exempt from
disclosure.38 The exempting language of the section was so vague,
39
however, that many agencies used the section to authorize the with-
holding of information which Congress had intended to be made
available to the public."0 Congress sought to correct this abuse by
passing the FOIA, which replaced the original section 3. The lan-
guage of the exemptions in the FOIA is clearer and narrower than
that of the old section 341 and the Act expressly states that the specific
m"A proceeding before the Court of Claims to finally determine the amount, if any,
of excessive profits shall not be treated as a proceeding to review the determination of
the Board, but shall be treated as a proceeding de novo." 50 U.S.C. APP. § 1218 (Supp.
111, 1973), amending 50 U.S.C. APP. § 1218 (1970).
""The functions exercised under this title shall be excluded from the operation of
the Administrative Procedure Act (60 Stat. 237) except as to the requirements of
section 3 thereof." 50 U.S.C. APP. § 1221 (1970).
'Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238.
""The section has been drawn upon the theory that administrative operations and
procedures are public property which the general public . . . is entitled to know or
have the ready means of knowing with definiteness and assurance." S. REP. No. 752,
79th Cong., 1st Seass. 12 (1945). "The purpose of this section is to make access to public
records generally applicable, uniform and more readily determinable." H.R. REP. No.
1980, 79th Cong., 2d Seass. 23 (1946).
""Except to the extent that there is involved (1) any function of the United States
requiring secrecy in the public interest or (2) any matter relating solely to the internal
management of an agency . . . ." Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238.
"Save as otherwise required by statute, matters of official record shall in accord-
ance with published rule be made available to persons properly and directly concerned
except information held confidential for good cause found." Id. § 3(c).
"See note 38 supra.
40 Section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act. . .is full of loop-
holes which allows agencies to deny legitimate information to the
public. Innumerable times, it appears that information is withheld
only to cover up embarrassing mistakes or irregularities and the with-
holding justified by such phrases in section 3 . . .as-"requiring se-
crecy in the public interest," or "required for good cause to be held
confidential."
S. RFP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965).
""It is the purpose of the present bill. . . to establish a general philosophy of full
agency disclosure unless information is exempted under clearly delineated statutory
1975]
198 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXII
exemptions are the only authorizations for withholding information
sought under the Act. 2 To ensure agency compliance with the disclo-
sure policy of the FOIA, Congress provided any person improperly
denied information by an agency the right to court review of the
denial, and provided the district courts with equitable powers to
enjoin the agency from withholding the information sought.43 To help
prevent the destruction of the right to disclosure by agency or court
delay, the Act specifically provided that the district courts should
expedite the hearing of FOIA cases."
In Bannercraft, however, the congressional intent to provide eq-
uitable relief to parties improperly denied information did not appear
strong enough to the Court to make appropriate a district court re-
straint of renegotiations. In coming to this conclusion, the majority
began with the proposition that pre-FOIA Supreme Court decisions
had established that contractors could not obtain a court restraint of
renegotiations pending court resolution of any claim, whether the
claim was statutory, constitutional, or procedural.45 As an important
reason for barring restraints, these decisions had stressed that the
congressional desire for speed in the determination of excess profits
would be frustrated if courts were allowed to restrain renegotiations. 6
The Bannercraft Court reasoned that a restraint in an FOIA case
would have the same delaying effect and, moreover, would encourage
contractors to file FOIA cases merely to postpone the determination
of the amount of their excess profits.47 Apparently, the Court con-
language. . . .It is essential that agency personnel, and the courts as well, be given
definitive guidelines in setting information policies." Id.
425 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1970).
Id. § 552(a)(3).
'Id. Commenting on this provision, the Senate Report to S. 1666, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1964), stated that unless the courts had the power to expedite FOIA cases, the
court remedy provided by the statute "might be of little practical value." S. REP. No.
1219, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1964). S. 1666 was the basis for the FOIA. S. REP. No.
813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1965).
"Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948); Aircraft & Diesel Equip. Corp. v.
Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752 (1947); Macauley v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 327 U.S. 540 (1946).
"The Renegotiation Act's "entire structure indicates the congressional purpose to
have matters of renegotiation promptly and expeditiously settled; and to accomplish
this as far as possible both by informal negotiations and by introducing the compulsion
of finality at every stage unless each succeeding one is taken as commanded." Aircraft
& Diesel Equip. Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752, 770 (1947).
"To countenance short-circuiting of Tax Court [now Court of Claims] proceed-
ings here would be, under all the circumstances but more especially in view of Con-
gress' policy and command with respect to those proceedings, a long overreaching of
equity's strong arm." Id. at 781.
"See Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 23 (1974).
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cluded that the pre-FOIA rule should govern the Bannercraft case
unless Congress clearly intended that contractors use the FOIA to
obtain Board-held information during renegotiation proceedings,
thereby creating a specific exception to the general rule prohibiting
court interruption of renegotiations. 8
A review of the FOIA's legislative history convinced the majority
that Congress' main concern in passing the Act was to increase disclo-
sure of agency-held information to the general public and not to
provide new rules of discovery in agency proceedings for financially
interested parties. 9 Furthermore, the court found that Congress in-
tended that renegotiation promote informal bargaining between the
Board and the contractor and include all the normal risks of pure
bargaining, and that these qualities would be destroyed by allowing
contractors to obtain restraints of renegotiations during adjudication
of FOIA claims 0 These findings of congressional intent, when consid-
ered with the inability of the Bannercraft contractors to show that the
denial of restraints would irreparably defeat their rights to informa-
tion,5' led the majority to conclude that the pre-FOIA rule prohibiting
court restraints of renegotiations governed post-FOIA renegotiation
cases as well. 5
In contrast the Bannercraft dissent's examination of the legisla-
tive history of the FOIA led it to the conclusion that Congress in-
tended to provide not only the general public, but also agency liti-
gants, with the disclosure of government-held information. 3 Further,
the dissent accepted the contractors' arguments that unless their
FOIA rights were enforced at the stage of agency proceedings at which
they were improperly denied, the rights would be irretrievably lost
due to the lack of authority at higher levels of renegotiation to correct
errors made at lower levels.5 4 The dissent concluded that if the con-
tractors did not receive a restraint of proceedings pending the resolu-
tion of their claims to information, the FOIA would be useless to
them, a result which the dissent viewed as contrary to congressional
intent.5
Although the dissent was vigorous, the majority decision has
firmly established that restraints of agency proceedings will not be
"See id. at 22.
"Id. at 22, 24.





-Id. at 26, 30, 33.
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available to contractors in future FOIA-renegotiation cases.' The
decision was very narrow, however, for the Court was careful to state
that the prohibition of restraint applies only to renegotiations. 7
Bannercraft leaves undecided whether a district court, while consid-
ering a party's FOIA claim, may restrain the proceedings of an agency
other than the Renegotiation Board. 8 An analysis of the reasoning
behind Bannercraft may offer litigants in future FIOA-agency cases
an indication of what courts following the Bannercraft decision may
require before allowing a restraint of agency proceedings.
In deciding whether the administrative procedure set up under
the Renegotiation Act could be interrupted for court adjudication of
FOIA claims, the Bannercraft majority applied the reasoning process
usually adopted by courts in administrative cases involving restraints
and embodied in the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. 9 In general terms, the doctrine provides that "no one is
mSee note 57 infra.
51 With the express vesting of equitable jurisdiction in the district court
by § 552(a), there is little to suggest, despite the Act's primary pur-
pose, that Congress sought to limit the inherent powers of an equity
court.
IV
We find it unnecessary, however, to decide in these cases,
whether, or under what circumstances, it would be proper for the
District Court to exercise jurisdiction to enjoin agency action pending
the resolution of an asserted FOIA claim. We hold only that in a
renegotiation case the contractor is obliged to pursue its adminis-
trative remedy and, when it fails to do so, may not obtain its ends
through the route of judicial interference.
Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 20 (1974).
58Id.
59See 3 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 20.01 (1958).
It should be noted that Bannercraft does not fit into the usual pattern of cases
which require the exhaustion of administrative remedies. A typical case is Myers v.
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938) where the petititioner applied to
the court for an injunction of NLRB proceedings claiming that it was not subject to
the Board's jurisdiction because its business was not in interstate commerce. The
Supreme Court refused to allow an injunction, finding that Congress had placed juris-
diction in the NLRB to decide whether certain labor practices affected interstate
commerce. Id. In essence, the petitioner was seeking to substitute an unauthorized
court proceeding for the authorized agency proceeding. The Bannercraft case is more
complex, however, because, though the Renegotiation Board is authorized to deter-
mine excess profits, the district court is empowered to hear FOIA claims. If a restraint
of renegotiations is needed to prevent the irreparable loss of a contractor's right to the
timely disclosure of information, the problem arises of determining which congression-
ally authorized procedure should be allowed to disrupt the other.
The Bannercraft contractors argued, in effect, that each procedure should be
considered independently of the other. Thus if a contractor had demanded materials
AGENCY PROCEEDINGS
entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the
prescribed administrative procedure has been exhausted.""0 The rea-
sons for applying this doctrine are varied. First, Congress has usually
established an administrative procedure to resolve a particular type
of question or to regulate a specific class of individuals or businesses.
If the agency is allowed to decide questions or cases within its juris-
diction in the first instance without court interference, it can both
utilize the expertise which it has acquired in considering similar cases
and promote consistency of results by applying the same standards
in all similar cases. Judicial resolution of these cases at intermediate
stages of agency proceedings could destroy uniformity and dilute the
advantages of agency expertise.6 ' Second, considerations of efficiency
generally favor a requirement of exhaustion of administrative proce-
dures because the agency process will usually move more rapidly
without court interruption."2 Moreover, court review might become
unnecessary if agency proceedings are allowed to run their full course
because errors made at an early stage may be corrected at a later
stage. 3 Third, if court review does become necessary, the agency, if
allowed to finish its consideration of a case, will have created a record
of the Renegotiation Board and had been refused, he had exhausted the administrative
procedure for acquiring the materials and was entitled to full court relief, including a
restraint of renegotiations if this would protect his FOIA rights. See Brief for Respon-
dent David B. Lilly Co. at 17-18, Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415
U.S. 1 (1974). Though this conceptualization of the problem is neat, it overlooks the
problem that the policy of disclosure behind the FOIA might conflict with a congres-
sional intent that renegotiation involve informal bargaining without court interrup-
tion.
The Bannercraft majority's approach of looking at the case as a typical exhaustion
of remedies case, though it strains the usual conceptualization of exhaustion cases, has
the advantage of balancing the apparently conflicting congressional policies in decid-
ing which will govern. This approach seems more nearly to carry out one of the main
reasons for applying the exhaustion doctrine-to follow congressional intent. See text
accompanying note 65-66 infra.
"Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938).
1""[It was thought desirable to preface all judicial action by a resort to expert
administrative knowledge and experience, and thus minimize the confusion that would
result from inconsistent decisions of district and circuit courts rendered without the
aid of administrative interpretation." Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 433 (1944).
See also Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 37 (1972); McKart v. United States, 395 U.S.
185, 193-94 (1969); FCC v. Schrieber, 381 U.S. 279, 290-91 (1965); Far East Conference
v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574 (1952).
"McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 194 (1969).
'3Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 37 (1972); Aircraft & Diesel Equip. Corp. v.
Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752, 772-73 (1947); Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Slattery, 302 U.S. 300,
311 (1937).
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to be used as a basis for court review." Fourth, judicial respect for
congressional policy usually requires a court to refrain from adjudi-
cating questions which Congress intended the agency to decide in the
first instance. 5 Court interruption and substitution of judicial pro-
ceedings for those of the agency might frustrate a congressional desire
that certain cases be resolved by procedures which are different from
those used in a court or that agency proceedings move along unde-
layed 6
Though in a future FOIA-agency case all four factors could be
relevant to the decision of the case, the Bannercraft Court relied on
the fourth,67 congressional policy, in deciding that the contractors had
to exhaust the renegotiation procedure and could not receive a re-
straint while presenting their FOIA claims in district courts. In reach-.
ing this decision, the Bannercraft Court balanced the congressional
policies behind the two statutes involved in the case.68 On one side
"4Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 37 (1972); McKart v. United States, 395 U.S.
185, 194 (1969).
65 Where Congress has clearly commanded that administrative
judgment be taken initially or exclusively, the courts have no lawful
function to anticipate the administrative decision with their
own. . . . To do this not only would contravene the will of Congress
as a matter of restricting or deferring judicial action. It would nullify
the congressional objects in providing the administrative determina-
tion.
Aircraft & Diesel Equip. Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752, 767 (1947); accord, McKart v.
United States, 395 U.S. 185, 194 (1969).
"Aircraft & Diesel Equip. Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752, 770, 781 (1947). See note
46 supra.
"7Both in Bannercraft and in most future FOIA-agency cases the first three reasons
for requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies (see text accompanying notes 61-
64 supra) would not apply. The first reason, court deference to agency judgment to
promote expertise and consistency, was congressionally overruled in FOIA cases, be-
cause Congress made the district courts the enforcement arm of the Act. 5 U.S.C. §
552(a)(3) (1970). The second reason, promotion of efficiency, would also not be appos-
ite in most FOIA-agency cases. When the Bannercraft Court indicated that contractors
engaged in renegotiations could file FOIA suits (see note 7 supra), it impliedly rejected
the argument that administrative procedures should be allowed to proceed unhindered
so that earlier errors could be corrected later. Further, if courts may hear FOIA cases
at all before the conclusion of agency action, arguably it would be more efficient to
stay agency proceedings pending court decision of the claim to avoid the wasteful
exhausting of erring procedures. Cf. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 194 (1969).
The third reason for requiring exhaustion-allowing the agency an opportunity to
build a record for court review-is inapplicable because the district court proceeding
in an FOIA case is de novo, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970), and a restraint pending the
resolution of the claim would not prevent the agency from compiling a record for review
when agency proceedings resumed after the settlement of the FOIA suit.
""Success lies in providing a workable formula which encompasses, balances, and
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of the balance was the FOIA, which the Court viewed as not expressly
intended to provide agency litigants with a new tool of discovery." On
the other side of the balance was the Renegotiation Act, which the
majority found to embody a clear congressional policy requiring expe-
ditious renegotiation proceedings in which the Board and the contrac-
tor attempt to negotiate an agreement to eliminate excessive profits."
The Court's balancing of the policy interests favored prompt and
informal negotiations which a restraint would destroy.71 However, in
other cases, a change in the congressional policy to be considered
could shift the balance and aid in leading a court to grant a restraint.
In future cases involving other agencies, the two policy interests in-
volved will be Congress' purpose behind the FOIA and the congres-
sional intent expressed in the act creating the agency whose proceed-
ings the litigant seeks to have restrained.
Because the congressional purpose behind the FOIA was a factor
in the Bannercraft Court's balancing of congressional policy, the ef-
fect of the FOIA on the balance in a future case can be judged by
determining the Bannercraft majority's finding as to the nature of the
congressional policy embodied in the FOIA. The Court's statement
that the FOIA was not designed to provide a tool of discovery for
financially interested parties in agency proceedings72 can be read in
two ways, each leading to a different result. If Congress meant to bar
agency litigants from using the FOIA to obtain materials, the balance
in a future case would probably not favor the granting of a restraint
of agency proceedings. If, however, Congress intended neither to pro-
hibit nor to promote agency litigant use of the FOIA, the tipping of
the balance in a future case would depend on the nature of the con-
gressional policy behind the statute setting up the agency proceed-
ings to be restrained. The proper reading of the Bannercraft opinion
seems to be the latter: Congress intended neither to prohibit nor to
promote agency litigant use of the FOIA.
protects all interests, yet places emphasis on the fullest responsible disclosure." S. REP.
No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965).
The Supreme Court adopted this flexible approach in EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73,
80 (1973), where the Court commented: "It is in the context of the Act's attempt to
provide a 'workable formula' that 'balances, and protects all interests,' that the con-
flicting claims over documents in this case must be considered."
It would seem that the Bannercraft Court adopted the balancing approach to
avoid frustrating the congressional policies which it found embodied in the Renegotia-
tion Act and the FOIA.
"See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
7OSee notes 46-47, 50 supra and accompanying text.
"Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 20 (1974).
721d. at 22, 24.
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This reading of the Bannercraft decision is supported by the
somewhat confusing paragraph of the majority opinion73 which states
that a restraint of renegotiations, relief not specifically provided by
the FOIA, would allow the contractors to discover materials which
would not be disclosable under Board regulations, a use of the FOIA
which Congress did not expressly approve. 7 At the same time, how-
ever, the Court also indicated that a contractor involved in renegotia-
tions could file an FOIA suit and could receive the Act's specifically-
mentioned relief requiring agency disclosure. 5 Thus the majority
seemed to find that in view of both the rule prohibiting restraints of
renegotiations and the lack of irreparable harm to the contractors if
renegotiations continued, the absence of a congressional intent to
broaden agency discovery rules in the FOIA meant that the district
courts could not expand the relief specifically mentioned in the Act
to include a restraint. However, the district courts could hear a con-
tractor's FOIA claim while renegotiations continued uninterrupted
and could order agency disclosure of materials if proper. In short,
while congressional policy did not prohibit agency litigants from
using the FOIA to obtain agency-held materials, it did not promote
such use of the FOIA and, therefore, did not justify the granting of a
restraint to further the discovery of agency-held documents.
The conclusion that Congress did not intend to prohibit use of
the FOIA to obtain agency-held information is supported by the legis-
lative history of two of the Act's provisions. One, exemption 7 of the
FOIA, excludes from disclosure "investigatory files compiled for law
enforcement purposes except to the extent available by law to a party
other than an agency."7 Explaining this language, the House Report
stated that the FOIA was "not intended to give a private party indi-
rectly any earlier or greater access to investigatory files than he would
have directly. 7 7 In this context, investigatory files include not only
those compiled for the enforcement of criminal laws, but also files
7 Interference with the agency proceeding opens the way to the use of
the FOIA as a tool of discovery ... over and beyond that provided
by the regulations issued by the Renegotiation Board for its proceed-
ings .... Discovery for litigation purposes is not an expressly indi-
cated purpose of the Act. Protection for the contractor in the renego-
tiation process is afforded through the injunctive power specifically
bestowed by 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3).




75See id. at 24, 26.
755 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1970).
7 H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1966).
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prepared in connection with agency regulation under statutes such as
the labor and securities laws. 8 Thus, one of the purposes of the ex-
emption seems to be to prevent parties being investigated by agencies
from using the FOIA to discover the agencies' files before they would
normally be available. Apparently, therefore, Congress foresaw that
parties engaged in agency proceedings would attempt to use the FOIA
as a discovery tool and took specific precautions to prevent disclosure
of materials which it found should be withheld. Conversely, it would
seem that materials which Congress did not expressly exempt from
disclosure under the FOIA were not intended to be withheld from
agency litigants.
If in general Congress did not intend to prohibit agency litigants
from obtaining materials disclosable under the FOIA, the question
arises whether Congress intended that such materials be obtained in
those instances when agency rules of discovery barred disclosure. The
effect of agency rules of discovery could be important, for example,
in applying exemption 5 of the FOIA,78 which prohibits the obtaining
of "inter-agency and intra-agency memorandums or letters which
would not be available by law to a party . . . in litigation with the
agency."8 The availability of these memoranda and letters under
exemption 5, therefore, depends on the rules of discovery applicable
in litigation. If, in this context, "litigation" means not only court
adjudication but also agency proceedings, then agency rules of dis-.
covery could limit the disclosure of inter- and intra-agency materials.
However, the Supreme Court impliedly rejected a reading of "litiga-
tion" to include agency proceedings in EPA v. Mink81 where it inter-
preted exemption 5 as a congressional adoption of court rules of dis-
covery regarding intra-agency materials.12 Relying on this case, a
court of appeals stated:
[I]t seems clear that Congres§, in enacting the exemption, did
not mean for agencies to refuse disclosure of documents merely
on the ground that such documents were customarily circu-
lated only within the bureaucracy. . . .If agency custom were
the touchstone for applicability of the exemption, the pro-
disclosure policy of the Act would be easily evaded.
7id.
7'5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1970).
MId.
"1410 U.S. 73 (1973).
1did. at 91.
mGrumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 482 F.2d 710,717 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
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It would appear that Congress intended only court rules and not
agency rules of discovery to determine what materials are excluded
from disclosure by exemption 5. Reading exemption 5 together with
exemption 7 indicates that Congress apparently foresaw that agency
litigants would use the FOIA to obtain materials which might not be
available under agency discovery rules. Where it objected to such use
of the FOIA, it wrote an exemption; but where it did not object, it
left the Act's general rule of disclosure to govern in FOIA cases. This
textual examination, in conjunction with the Court's indication in
Bannercraft that a contractor could file an FOIA suit while engaged
in renegotiations, demonstrates that Congress did not intend to pro-
hibit agency litigants from using the FOIA to obtain agency-held
information, even if it did not expressly indicate that the FOIA cre-
ated new agency discovery rules. Thus the FOIA seems to be neutral
with regard to agency litigants making the FOIA a discovery tool.
If the congressional policy embodied in the FOIA is a neutral
factor, the legislative intent expressed in the act on the other side of
the balance-the act creating the agency proceeding which the liti-
gant seeks to have restrained-will probably determine whether a
court's balancing of congressional policy weighs in favor of or against
a restraint of agency proceedings. In Bannercraft, the statute in-
volved was the Renegotiation Act, which the Court found to set up a
procedure which Congress intended to advance expeditiously and to
allow informal bargaining between the Board and the contractor."
The problem of informal bargaining is probably unique to the renego-
tiation process,85 so the question of whether a restraint would destroy
bargaining would most likely not arise in a different FOIA-agency
case. However, the issue of Congress' desire to prevent delay in
agency proceedings might arise in cases involving other agencies. If
a litigant in a future FOIA-agency case is confronted by the argument
that delay of agency proceedings caused by a restraint would frus-
trate congressional intent, he must present evidence to show that a
restraint to further the disclosure policy of the FOIA would not con-
travene congressional policy. An analysis of the Bannercraft Court's
finding that renegotiations should not be delayed demonstrates how
'See notes 46-47, 50 supra and accompanying text.
Renegotiation involves several levels of informal negotiations between the Board
and the contractor (see text accompanying notes 29-31 supra) while proceedings before
the FTC and the NLRB, for example, involve formal hearings. Compare 50 U.S.C. APP.
§ 1215(a) (Supp. III, 1973), amending 50 U.S.C. APP. § 1215 (1970) with 15 U.S.C. §
45(b) (1970) (hearings before the FTC on unfair trade practices) and 29 U.S.C. § 160(b)
(1970) (hearings before the NLRB on unfair labor practices).
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the presentation of such evidence could change the outcome in a later
case.
The Bannercraft majority's reliance on the 1947 case Aircraft &
Diesel Equipment Corp. v. Hirsch8 for the proposition that Congress
intended renegotiations to proceed expeditiously and without re-
straints,87 read together with its statement that the FOIA did not
change the pre-FOIA rule preventing court interference with renego-
tiations,88 seems to indicate a finding by the Court that Congress
condemned all causes of delayed renegotiations. Apparently this is an
accurate statement of congressional policy concerning wartime rene-
gotiation, for successful fighting of the war required the procurement
of large amounts of materials in short periods of time. Because of the
resulting hasty procurement, advance estimates of costs were often
inaccurate-a problem which renegotiation was intended to rectify
by allowing a review of profits after production experience had estab-
lished more accurate cost figures. Yet, if contractors became bogged
down in protracted renegotiations, procurement could be slowed. To
eliminate one cause of delay, Congress reduced to a minimum the
availability of court proceedings. 9
Evidence concerning the modem function of renegotiation, not
presented in the Bannercraft briefs, raises some doubt as to the abso-
lute nature of the congressional command of minimum delay in the
proceedings. At present, the complexity and novelty of space and
military procurement rather than the haste of wartime procurement
form the main reasons for providing a later look at a contractor's
profits.9" As a result of this new function, renegotiation is currently a
slow process: statistics for 1973 show that the average processing time
for cases filed with the regional boards, subdivisions of the Renegotia-
-331 U.S. 752 (1947).
17Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 21 (1974).
1id. at 22.
"Aircraft & Diesel Equip. Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752, 770 (1947); accord, Lich-
ter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 763 n.7, 793 (1948).
[M]odem military and space procurement is characterized by chang-
ing technical requirements and increasing complexity. The nature of
the procurement often means that there is a lack of established mar-
ket costs or prices to guide Government procurement personnel. As a
result, negotiated contracts-in other words, contracts that are not
formally advertised-are used for the bulk of this procurement.
[Tihe renegotiation process is an after-the-fact review to elimi-
nate excessive profits which may arise on procurement occurring
under these conditions.
119 CONG. REc. 3468 (daily ed. May 9, 1973) (statement of Rep. Griffiths of Michigan,
member of the House Ways and Means Committee which favorably reported the bill).
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tion Board, was 29 months." Congress recognized the delaying effect
of renegotiation's present purpose when it removed jurisdiction to
redetermine the Board's finding of excess profits from the Tax Court
to the Court of Claims.2 The Senate Report noted that one of the
major reasons for the shift was the Court of Claims' ability to handle
cases "extending over a long period of time. . . and involving a large
volume of evidence. Both of these elements customarily exist in a
renegotiation case.
'9 3
In light of this evidence that Congress expects renegotiations to
proceed slowly to accommodate the complex nature of its current
purpose, it would seem inaccurate to find that all causes of delay of
renegotiations are contrary to congressional intent. If some causes of
delay are not contrary to Congress' will, the proper question would
seem to be whether the particular cause of delay, in this context an
FOIA suit and restraint, would frustrate congressional policy. Had
this evidence been presented to the Bannercraft Court and had the
majority accepted this reasoning and found that an FOIA delay
would not be objectionable, it might not have prohibited restraints
in all FOIA-renegotiation cases. If the majority was concerned that
objectionable delays would result from contractors' frivolous FOIA
suits, it could have prevented most of these unwarranted delays by
requiring district courts, before granting restraints, strictly to apply
the rule that a petitioner show that he will probably win on the merits
of his claim. 4 The outcome in a future FOIA-agency case, therefore,
might well depend on a showing that, although Congress generally
intended an agency procedure to advance without delay, it did not
intend to prevent congressionally authorized court proceedings under
the FOIA from operating effectively, even though the FOIA proceed-
ing would delay the agency procedure. If the future litigant can make
such a showing, when the court balances the act creating the agency
proceedings which he seeks to have restrained with the neutral FOIA,
the balance should lean towards allowing a restraint.
Yet even if a future FOIA-agency litigant demonstrates that the
1'18 RENEGOTIATION BOARD ANNUAL REPORT 10 (1973).
'2Act of July 1, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-40, § 3, 85 Stat. 98.
'3S. REP. No. 92-245, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (reprinted at 117 CONG. REc.
22879, 22881 (1971)).
"In considering whether to grant a restraint of agency proceedings, the court in
Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1958) inquired: "Has
the petitioner made a strong showing that it is likely to prevail on the merits of its
appeal? Without such a substantial indication of probable success, there would be no
justification for the court's intrusion into the ordinary processes of administration and
judicial review." Id. at 925.
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balancing of congressional intent favors a restraint, the Bannercraft
decision indicates that he must also show that his right to informa-
tion under the FOIA will be irretrievably lost unless the court re-
strains agency proceedings." The Bannercraft contractors attempted
to make such a showing of irreparable harm,"5 but the majority re-
jected their arguments. 7 Because of the unique nature of renegotia-
tion, the Court's reasons for rejecting the arguments of irreparable
harm may also beunique to renegotiation. The majority's reasons for
rejection'should be examined, however, to demonstrate why the
Bannercraft decision should not determine, the adequacy of a liti-
gant's showing of irreparable harm in future FOIA cases involving
agencies with procedures different from those of the Renegotiation
Board.
By requiring the Bannercraft contractors to exhaust the adminis-
trative process, the Court required them to go through the various
steps of renegotiation at the agency level and then to appeal to the
""Without a clear showing of irreparable injury. . . failure to exhaust adminis-
trative remedies serves as a bar to judicial intervention into the agency process."
Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 24 (1974).
The Bannercraft Court approved the court of appeals' statement in Sears Roebuck
& Co. v. NLRB, 473 F.2d 91, 93 (D.C. Cir. 1972): " . . . it is only in extraordinary
circumstances that a court may, in the sound exercise of discretion, intervene to
interrupt agency proceedings to dispose of a single, intermediate or collateral issue. A
cogent showing of irreparable harm is an indispensable condition of such interven-
tion." 415 U.S. at 24. The court of appeals decision in Bannercraft reached the same
result but in different terms: "The first purpose served by the exhaustion doctrine
stems not so much from the law of administrative agencies as from general equity
jurisprudence. A party seeking equitable relief must always show that he would suffer
some sort of irreparable injury without it." Bannercraft Clothing Co. v. Renegotiation
Bd., 466 F.2d 345, 355 (D.C. Cir. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 415 U.S. 1 (1974).
In some instances, courts will grant a restraint of agency proceedings pending
court review of agency action if the petitioner makes only a showing of irreparable
harm. For example, the Supreme Court in Utah Fuel Co. v. Nat'l Bituminous Coal
Comm'n, 306 U.S. 56 (1939), found that the petitioner's claim that the commission's
threatened disclosure of confidential materials would irreparably harm it was suffi-
cient to allow a court restraint of proceedings. A litigant in an FOIA-agency case,
however, should not rely solely on a showing of irreparable harm because in deciding
whether to restrain proceedings, courts take into account the public interest. Virginia
Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Note, Stays of
Federal Administrative Action, 67 HAv. L. REv. 876, 877 (1954). A petitioner, there-
fore, should accompany his arguments of irreparable harm with a showing that con-
gressional policy favors, or at least does not bar, a restraint in his case.
"Brief for Respondent Bannercraft Clothing Co. at 20-28; Brief for Respondent
David B. Lilly Co. at 20-21, Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S.
1 (1974).
"'Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 23 (1974).
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Court of Claims for a de novo determination of excess profits. 8 The
majority found that requiring the contractors to complete the renego-
tiation process was proper because the Court of Claims proceeding
would provide adequate protection for the contractors' rights to infor-
mation." The authority cited for this position was a law review note '1"
which relied on Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Association v. FPC.'°' In
that case, the association sought to intervene in a Federal Power
Commission proceeding, and when it was refused its request, it
sought a restraint of proceedings while the court determined its right
to intervene.1 0 2 The court of appeals refused to approve a restraint,
finding that the association could assert its claim in a judicial review
of final agency action. The court review was an adequate remedy
because if the association were correct in its claim, it could intervene
in a court-ordered de novo consideration of the matter by the FPC.'
0 3
In essence, this relief returned the parties very nearly to their pre-
error positions and allowed the administrative procedure to rerun its
course without the error complained of at the court review of the first
agency proceeding.
In renegotiation cases, however, the Court of Claims may not
order the contractors to a second round of negotiations with the Board
personnel who improperly denied them information, but must itself
redetermine the amounts which the contractors must refund to the
government. 4 Because of the vagueness of the statutory standards
governing renegotiation"05- standards which require the application
"See text accompanying notes 24-34 supra.
"'Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 23 (1974).
'As authority for this point, the Court cited only Note, 41 GEO. WAsH. L. REv.
1072, 1084 (1973). 415 U.S. at 23.
1259 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
11Id. at 923-24.
"'Id. at 926-27.
"'°50 U.S.C. App. § 1218 (Supp. I1, 1973), amending 50 U.S.C. Ap. § 1218 (1970).
1"1(e) Excessive Profits.
The term "excessive profits" means the portion of the profits
derived from contracts with the Departments and subcontracts which
is determined in accordance with this title . . . to be excessive. In
determining excessive profits favorable recognition must be given to
the efficiency of the contractor or subcontractor, with particular re-
gard to attainment of quantity and quality production, reduction of
costs, and economy in the use of materials, facilities, and manpower;
and in addition, there shall be taken into consideration the following
factors:
(1) Reasonableness of costs and profits, with particular
regard to volume of production, normal earnings, and com-
parison of war and peacetime products;
(2) The net worth, with particular regard to the amount
and source of public and private capital employed;
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of a large amount of personal judgment'"- the chances are great that
the final determination of excess profits made by the Court of Claims
will differ from that which the contractors could have negotiated at
the agency level where the information was improperly denied them.
It is not unlikely that the contractors' liability for excess profits will
be increased if they move beyond the level where the information was
withheld from them; thus, the uncertainty of the Court of Claims
relief in renegotiations is greater than that of the agency reconsidera-
tion provided in Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Association v. FPC.111
(3) Extent of risk assumed, including the risk incident
to reasonable pricing policies;
(4) Nature and extent of contribution to the defense
effort, including inventive and developmental contribution
and cooperation with the Government and other contrac-
tors in supplying technical assistance;
(5) Character of business, including source and nature
of materials, complexity of manufacturing technique, char-
acter and extent of subcontracting, and rate of turn-over;
(6) Such other factors the consideration of which the
public interest and fair and equitable dealing may require,
which factors shall be published in the regulations of the
Board from time to time as adopted.
50 U.S.C. APP. § 1213(e) (1970).
'"'Determining excess profits "requires the exercise of an unusually high degree of
administrative discretion and judgment on the part of men rather than the application
of fixed and determinable rules of law." S. REP. No. 407, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1959).
The report states this factor as a reason for not making the Renegotiation Act perma-
nent. By extending it only for a short time, Congress may periodically review renegotia-
tion. Id. The same consideration caused the short extensions of the Act by the 92d
Congress, S. REP. No. 92-245, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (reprinted at 117 CONG. Rc.
22879, 22880 (1971)), and by the 93d Congress. 119 CONG. REc. 3468 (daily ed. May 9,
1973) (statement of Rep. Griffiths of Michigan, member of the House Ways and Means
Committee which favorably reported the bill).
907262 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1958). It could be argued that the ability of the
Bannercraft contractors to file an FOIA suit while renegotiations continued (Renego-
tiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 24, 26 (1974)) and expedited FOIA
hearings .(5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970)) would provide the contractors with the informa-
tion they requested at the level at which it was improperly denied because renegotia-
tions proceed slowly. See text accompanying note 91 supra. The Bannercraft Court,
however, indicated that not all FOIA cases are resolved quickly. 415 U.S. at 23. Argua-
bly, therefore, the FOIA suit without a restraint is uncertain relief because the time
required to determine an FOIA claim would depend on several factors, including the
Renegotiation Board's delaying the resolution of a case by appealing an unfavorable
district court order.
If the contractors move beyond the level of renegotiations at which the information
was denied, the application of the vague statutory standards by persons other than
those who improperly withheld information combined with the de novo character of
each renegotiation stage (see note 30 supra) makes the relief provided the contractors
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The Bannercraft Court's disregard of this distinction could mean that
even a showing of a high degree of uncertainty of relief would not be
sufficient to allow a district court to restrain agency proceedings. If
so, it is unlikely that litigants in future FOIA-agency cases could ever
receive a restraint.
The unique nature of renegotiation, however, probably makes
Bannercraft distinguishable from other FOIA-agency cases. The ma-
jority found that the uncertainty of relief at the Court of Claims
level-the risk that the final determination of excess profits might
exceed that which a contractor could have negotiated earlier-was
intended by Congress to characterize the entire renegotiation pro-
cess. ' 8 Therefore, in cases involving other agencies, a litigant might
be able to show that uncertainty of relief was not congressionally
incorporated into the procedure which he is attempting to have re-
strained. If he goes on to show that his right to information guaran-
teed by the FOIA will not be adequately protected in later stages of
agency proceedings, he may have made an adequate showing of irre-
parable harm. If such a showing is combined with his arguments that
congressional policy does not prohibit a restraint in his case and that
he will probably win on the merits of his FOIA claim," 9 the litigant
should be entitled to a restraint of agency proceedings pending the
resolution of his FOIA claim.
Thus, the significance of Bannercraft lies not only in its prohibi-
tion of restraints in renegotiation cases, but also in its holding that
generally district courts have full equitable powers under the FOIA11
and its indication that these courts could consider the merits of grant-
ing a restraint of agency proceedings in cases not involving the Rene-
gotiation Board."' Because the Court refused to allow a restraint in
Bannercraft, that case, if superficially read, could become general
authority for not allowing a restraint of any agency proceedings in
FOIA cases. This use of Bannercraft would ignore the Court's reason-
ing in the case. The majority's heavy reliance on congressional intent
would seem to indicate that the question of the appropriateness of a
restraint in FOIA-agency cases should be decided at least on an
much more uncertain than it would be if they were allowed to negotiate a second time,
this time with the materials they sought, with the personnel who denied them these
materials the first time.
'Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 25 (1974).
10'See note 94 supra. A strong showing of probability of success on the merits of a
claim might move a court to lessen the strictness of the required showing of irreparable
harm. Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
"'Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1974).
"id. at 20.
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agency by agency basis so that the different congressional intents
behind the various agency proceedings may be balanced with the
congressional policy expressed in the FOIA.
THOMAS HAL CLARKE, JR.

